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TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN OHIO AND
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE
One writer sums up the law with respect to trade secrets in the
following manner: "[T]he cases follow no set pattern, even though
there are a few basic principles. No single decision or group of de-
cisions can be construed as providing a conclusive answer to any
particular fact situation."1 Additionally, many writers discussing this
muddled area have found it necessary to conclude the following:
I]he effect of existing trade secret law on the national in-
terests has been more detrimental than beneficial. Because of its
inordinate complexity, the law of trade secrets is unpredictable
even within a particular jurisdiction. As a result, trade secret
owners are overprotected, often at the expense of their employees,
and always to the ultimate detriment of society. In the absence of
legislative guidance, the courts have been unable to formulate
satisfactory criteria for balancing the parties' rights. Moreover,
the interests of the general public have been virtually ignored.2
Even the most cursory perusal of the cases dealing with trade
secret law reveals that these contentions are correct. The courts'
application of the law, even to the same general sets of facts, may
differ markedly from one state to another and even within a single
state.
This Note will consider state and federal remedies for Ohio em-
ployers, with special consideration of (1) the proposed federal Unfair
Competition Act,3 (2) possible implied conditions in employment
contracts, and (3) suggested instructive clauses which will provide
maximum protection for trade secrets.
I. THE OHio LAW OF TRADE SECRETS
Traditionally, the Ohio courts have applied a strict set of re-
quirements in determining what constitutes a trade secret; however,
they have lately demonstrated a tendency to both liberalize and ex-
pand their definition. In 1964, as a part of its decision in B. F. Good-
rich Co. v. Wohlgemuth,4 one court of appeals of Ohio adopted in
part the definition of the Restatement of Torts.5 Then in 1965, in
1 Schatzel, Trade Secret Dilemma, 38 U. CoLo. L. R v. 311, 314 (1966).
2 Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire-A Proposed Federal Solution, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 1049 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Trade Secret Quagmire].
3 S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43(a)(4) (1967).
4 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
1; RESTATErEN or ToRTs § 757, comment b at 5 (1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation
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Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Services, Inc.,6 a common
pleas court defined a trade secret as "almost anything and everything
useful or advantageous in business activity that is not generally
known or easily or immediately ascertainable to members of the
trade."7 While this definition apparently indicates a conclusion by
one Ohio court that the term trade secrets in a general sense is in-
capable of definition, other courts have been willing to decide on a
case to case basis whether a trade secret does exist and, if so, whether
it should be protected.8 The courts have created certain guidelines
to apply to the facts of each case enabling them to conclude that a
trade secret does or does not exist.9
Among the traditional approaches to trade secrets law has been
one which grants relief on the basis that the employer has some
property right in the subject matter of the trade secret and that the
defendants have in some way violated the employer's property right.
A second major approach, and the one adhered to presently by nearly
all jurisdictions, grants relief on the basis that the employer and the
employee were in a confidential relationship and that the employee's
use or revelation of the secret information breached that confiden-
tial relationship.
One of the requirements for a trade secret is the rather obvious
one that a trade secret must to a certain degree be secret.10 The
Ohio courts have, when considering secrecy, referred to the secret
as a property right," but this view has fallen into general disfavor in
the vast majority of the states. The United States Supreme Court
as long ago as 1917 stated:
[t]he word property as applied to... trade secrets is an unana-
lyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the pri-
mary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements
of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an op-
portunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or
a list of customers.
6 194 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio C.P. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 143,
207 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
7 Id. at 175.
8 Note, Customer Lists As Trade Secrets in Ohio, 18 W. Ras. L. RFv. 232 (1966).
9 Id. at 234. Among the factors that the courts have considered are: secrecy,
novelty, means of procuring or developing it, breach of confidence reposed in the em-
ployee by the employer.
10 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E2d 99 (1963).
11 Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v. Noyes, 17 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 529 (C.P. 1915).
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or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through
a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be
denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting
point for the present matter is not property .... but that the
defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs.12
As the property theory of trade secrets fell into general disre-
pute, evidenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in the Masland
case, the theory of the breach of a confidential relationship as the
primary basis of recovery achieved a preferred position. The present
trade secret cases almost universally turn on the existence and breach
of a confidential relationship. 13
It is a generally accepted principle that after termination of
his period of employment an employee may enter into competition
with his former employer.' 4 In addition, the employee may, in the
absence of a restrictive contract provision, utilize the skill and gen-
eral knowledge, other than trade secrets, that he acquired while
engaged in his former employment. 5
What is entitled to protection is 'knowledge confidentially
gained' but 'an employer cannot prevent his employee from
using the skill and intelligence acquired through experience
received in the course of the employment. The employee may
achieve superiority by every lawful means and upon the rightful
termination of his contract use that superiority for the benefit
of rivals in business of his former employer." 6
While, absent some type of restrictive covenant inserted in the
contract of employment or separately executed, the employer cannot
prevent the use of the general knowledge and skill of a former em-
ployee even though acquired in the course of the former employ-
ment;' 7 the employee cannot lawfully reveal to third persons or use
12 E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
13 Schmidinger v. Welsh, 243 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.J. 1965); A.H. Emery Co. v.
Marcan Prod. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio
St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,
192 N.E.2d 99 (1963); Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 114
N.E.2d 149 (1953).
14 Inboden v. Hawker, 41 N.E.2d 271, 276 (Ohio App. 1941); Curry v. Marquart,
133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
'5 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500, 192 N.E.2d 99,
105 (1963).
16 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 268 (E.D. La. 1967). Quoting
from Official Aviation Guide v. American Aviation Associated, Inc., 150 F.2d 173, 178
(7th Cir. 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 776.
17 Inboden v. Hawker, 41 N.E2d 271, 276 (Ohio App. 1941).
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in establishing a business of his own the knowledge of the former
employer's trade secrets that he gained by virtue of his employ-
ment.'8 The nature of the employment creates between the employee
and employer such a relationship of confidence and trust that the
employee is estopped from revealing those secrets to anyone or using
them himself.19 There is implied an obligation on the employee not
to disclose or use the trade secrets in any manner that would con-
stitute a breach of that confidential relationship.20 However, this
confidential relationship will be deemed to arise, in the absence of
a restrictive covenant, only when the knowledge that the former em-
ployee has gained was entrusted to him in confidence.21
An employer who institutes adequate security precautions
permits the courts without strained interpretations to recognize
the confidential relationship, to assert the importance of good
faith, and to point up its presence in a very practical and ethical
way.22
It is advisable for the employer having a valuable secret to at-
tempt to minimize any unnecessary revelations of the secrets to those
persons whose employment does not require knowledge of the in-
formation. A failure to restrict unnecessary intra-company dissem-
ination might serve as evidence that adequate security precautions
were not initiated or maintained to preserve the secrecy of the in-
formation. Employers should institute measures that assure evidence
of the factors set forth in the Restatement of Torts. 23 The Ohio
courts grant no presumption of secrecy to the employer seeldng pro-
18 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99, 100
(1963).
19 Id. at 493, 192 N.E.2d at 101.
20 Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 114 N.E.2d 149
(1953).
21 Id. at 507, 114 N.E.2d at 150.
22 Harris & Siegel, Trade Secrets in the Context of Positive Competition, 10 IDEA
297, 315 (19666). IDEA is Idea: Patent Trademark and Copyright Journal of Research
and Education.
23 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757, comment b at 6 (1939). Some factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether given information should be protected as one's trade
secret are: (1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2)
The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business;
(3) The extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; (4) The value of the information to him and his competitors; (5) The amount of
money or effort expended by him in developing the information; (6) The ease or diffi-
culty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
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tection, and the employer has the burden of proof as to whether the
subject matter involved is a trade secret of his business.24 If the em-
ployer does not fulfill the burden of proving it is a particular trade
secret of his business, he cannot claim that subject matter as a trade
secret.25 In addition the employer must demonstrate that he has
taken adequate security measures to protect his secrets.28
II. REMEDIES
A. Present State Remedies
A variety of remedies are available to the employer injured or
in imminent danger of being injured through disclosure of his trade
secrets. His remedies at law include damages for deceit, compensa-
tory damages for breach of contract, either express or implied, puni-
tive damages, and costs. 27 The remedy most commonly given by
courts of equity is a temporary28 or permanent 29 injunction.
The injunction may be used to prohibit the use or disclosure
of a trade secret, is available although no right of the employer has
yet been violated, and may issue regardless of whether the employer
and employee have agreed expressly that the employee would not
use or disclose the information. 0 It may compel surrender of the
embodiments of the trade secret,31 or may require sublicensing to
the former employer of any patents that were procured through use
of the wrongly appropriated trade secret.32 Other remedies that may
be obtained from a court of equity33 include enforcement of a cove-
nant of non-competition with the former employer,3 4 or of a cove-
24 Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E2.d 685, 709 (Ohio C.P.
1952).
25 Cameron Mach. Co. v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 115 A. 212 (N. J. Cl. 1921).
28 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
27 Trade Secret Quagmire, supra note 2, at 1053.
28 E.g., Space Aero Products Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74
(Ct. App. 1965).
29 E.g., A. D. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1935).
30 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgeamuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 NXE.2d 99 (1963).
31 Ernst Slide Fastener Co. v. Stamberg, 120 N.YS.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1953). "Em-
bodiments" refers to such things as drawings, sketches, blueprints, and any machines,
tools, etc. which the employee caused to be constructed through wrongful use of the
employer's trade secret.
32 Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342 (E. D. La.
1955).
83 See Trade Secret Quagmire, supra note 2, at 1053.
34 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 NE.2d 667 (1946).
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nant of non-disclosure of confidential information or trade secrets, 35
award of a reasonable royalty for use of the trade secret,36 and a
reconveyance of the misappropriated trade secret.37 This latter rem-
edy assumes an analysis of a trade secret being property.3 An in-
junction may also be obtained restraining the new employer from
using the information with knowledge of the confidential relation-
ship, and in this situation it has sometimes been said that the new
employer becomes a constructive trustee of the subject matter of the
trade secret.8 9
A court is not precluded from granting injunctive relief against
former employees by virtue of the absence of any employment con-
tract covenant not to compete. 40 However, such relief will be ganted
the former employer only upon a showing of convincing proof of a
harmful violation of his rights.41
The desirable scope of the injunction is an issue which has
received considerable debate in the cases. Most courts now refuse
to grant permanent injunctions restraining the use of trade secrets,
although such a remedy is sometimes given.42 There are three alter-
natives to the scope to be given an injunction in respect of a misap-
propriated trade secret.43 One view holds that a permanent injunc-
tion may issue without regard to public disclosure of the trade
secret. Under this view the guilty parties can never utilize the fruits
of their misdeeds. 44 The second is that, after the secret has been
publicly disclosed, even by the misappropriators, no injunction may
issue.45 The third alternative is that the appropriate period for the
injunction to run is that period of time which competitors would
35 Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (1903).
36 Engelhard Industries v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.
1963).
37 Pen Carbon Manifold Co. v. Tomney, 90 N.J. Eq. 233, 110 A. 445 (1919).
38 In addition to these remedies the misappropriating employee may be subject
to criminal sanctions. See 7 B.C. IND. & Coat. L. REv. 324, 326-29 (1966).
39 By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 167, 329 P.2d
147, 148 (1958).
40 United Insurance Co. v. Dienno, 248 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
41 American Alloy Steel Corp. v. Ross, 149 Cal. App. 215, 219, 308 P.2d 494, 497
(1957).
42 E.g., Kelite Corp. v. Khem Chemicals, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. 111. 1958).
43 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnes6ta Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141-42
(9th Cir. 1965).
44 Shellmar Prod. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936).
45 Conmar Prod. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949).
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require after public disclosure to develop a similar product. The
period is computed as if the defendants had not misappropriated the
secret and the industry in general did not have the tainted infor-
mation to develop similar products. 46 This latter position is more
acceptable when it is considered that generally the owner of a trade
secret has no property right in that secret. "Relief is granted only
when someone attempts to use the secret in violation of some general
duty of good faith such as an abuse of confidence. 47 Since the em-
ployer's "property" has not been stolen, but only his trust abused,
it would seem that to enjoin the miscreants forever, even after the
secret has been legitimately discovered elsewhere, might be an ex-
cessively harsh remedy unsuited to the injury. On the other hand,
to permit the wrongdoer to enjoy the fruits of his wrong and escape
injunctive sanction because the secret has subsequently become
known to the public makes a mockery of the honest man. The bet-
ter approach is that which follows the middle path of enjoining the
defendants for that period of time that would have been necessary
for the secret to become general public knowledge absent their
wrongful acts.
B. A Proposed Federal Statute
Proposed section 43(a)(4) of the Unfair Competition Act is de-
signed as an amendment to the Lanham Act.48 The section is a part
of the McClellan Bill introduced in 1967, and which at the time of
this writing is still in committee.
The bill is basically jurisdictional and is designed to give the
federal courts original jurisdiction over unfair competition actions
concurrent with the state courts.49
The proposed federal unfair competition statute is offered
... to provide a basis for a uniform federal law of unfair compe-
46 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 305 F.2d 134, 141-42
(9th Cir. 1965).
47 Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 405, 200 N.E.2d 615, 617
(1964).
48 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946). S. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 43(a)(4) (1967).
§ 43(a)(4) reads as follows:
(a). Any person who shall engage in any act, trade practice, or course of
conduct, in commerce, which .... (4) results or is likely to result in the wrong-
ful disclosure or misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or develop-
ment or commercial information maintained in confidence by another,.. . shall
be liable in a civil action for unfair competition.
49 Arnold, A Federal Unfair Competition Law, 57 TRA.iaacAm REP. 116 (1967).
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tition. There has been no federal common law in this field since
the decision of the Supreme Court in 1938 in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins.50 As a result, unfair competition affecting interstate
commerce is now governed by diverse and, at times, conflicting
state rulings and approaches. In addition, the conflict of laws
problems, when an act of unfair competition occurs in many
states, have become perplexing, if not insoluble, to the courts.51
This statute seeks to provide some degree of uniformity in this
area of the law by providing a framework of congressional guidelines
upon which the courts may engraft the more salutary of the common
law principles, absorbing these state law principles into a system of
federal law.52 The basic purpose of the proposed legislation is "to
create and outline a federal statutory tort of unfair competition
affecting interstate commerce, and to establish federal jurisdiction
over such tort claims regardless of diversity of citizenship. "5 3
Since most trade secret controversies today arise in the context
of large multi-state enterprises, the various and diverse state laws
with respect to trade secrets may engender serious problems of com-
pliance even for employers, employees, and competitors seeking to
act in good faith. Therefore, a uniform law of trade secrets is needed
to provide definite standards of conduct for these parties.5 4
The proposed bill does not generally seek to discard or alter
the existing substantive state laws. It does seek to facilitate the effec-
tiveness of those laws by applying them on a uniform federal basis55
and afford the employer protection additional to that gained through
the state law systems.
Section 43(a)(4) ... is directed to that area of unfair compe-
tition dealing with confidential information and trade secret law.
Trade secrets that are really secret present no problem; they are
clearly protected in all circumstances by all courts. A problem
area stems from the fact that most alleged secrets are secrets
only in a qualified sense: secret for one purpose but not for
another, secret from one person or group of persons but not from
another.
The amendment [43(a)(4)] is phrased to encompass all
wrongful disclosure or misappropriation of trade secrets or other
50 304 U.S. 64 (1988).
51 Brief In Support of Congressional Passage of Proposed Unfair Competition
Amendment to Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, [hereinafter referred to as Brief]
TRADEMARK REP. 88 (1967).
52 id. at 89.
53 Id. at 94.
54 Note, Trade Secret Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356, 872 (1967).
55 Brief, supra note 51, at 95.
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research, development or commercial information maintained
in confidence by the plaintiff.... Under this subsection, the
key to the granting of relief is intended to be the confidentiality
of the information as against the defendant, and commonly
though not necessarily always, as against the industry at the time
of the use which is alleged to be wrongful. Included also is the
protection of a company's confidential "know-how" against loss
through defection of key employees; but it is contemplated that
courts will reasonably protect an employee's right to use his
general experience in new employment.56
The language of the statute is phrased broadly to allow the
courts maximum freedom to develop the law with as little statutory
direction as possible.57
Section 43(b) of S.1154 provides that all the remedies of the
present Lanham Act would be available in a trade secret claim
affecting interstate commerce under section 43(a)(4) just as in an ac-
tion for infringement of federally registered trademarks. 5s However,
these remedies shall not affect any remedies otherwise obtainable
under state common or statutory law, or other federal statutes, and
it is provided that state jurisdiction shall not be preempted.59
III. REST=CTrivE COVENANTS
In order to protect an employer's trade secrets from intentional
or accidental disclosure to a competitor or use in a business of his
own by a former employee, it is advisable to include in the em-
ployee's contract of employment a restrictive clause or clauses which
spell out proper procedures to prevent or remedy disclosures. The
clause should be simply and clearly worded and its implications
should be explicitly brought to the employee's attention in order
that he understand clearly the nature of the confidential relationship
into which he is entering. Extraneous matter and unusual or unfair
requirements should be avoided. Although a restrictive clause may
not be necessary to afford the employer some sort of protection in
G6 Id. at 101-02.
57 Arnold, supra note 49, at 118.
5s Brief, supra note 51, at 106; The Lanham Act remedies are: (a) injunction; (b)
actual damages; (c) exemplary damages, up to three times actual damages; (d) profits
calculated on a peculiar burden of proof that a defendant can rarely if ever fully carry,
wherein plaintiff need only prove gross business income and it is defendant's burden to
prove and justify all his allocation of expenses to the particular product involved; (e)
any other measure the court deems just as compensatory damages; (f) costs; (g) at-
torney's fees.
69 Brief, supra note 51, at 89.
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the courts, it does provide a method of bringing home to the em-
ployee the existence of a confidential relationship; and if the clause
is breached, it may act as telling evidence of the employee's bad
faith. Also, if the clause provides definite procedures for redressing
the injury to the employer, it can set standards which a court may
apply in awarding relief.
There are two basic types of restrictive covenants which should
be examined and differentiated. The first is the covenant of non-
competition which may be used to protect a trade secret when
merely to permit the employee to work in the same area would al-
most of necessity result in disclosure of the secret. The second type
is the covenant of non-disclosure of trade secrets.
The primary questions which the attorney must ask himself
in preparing these clauses for an employer seeking protection are:
will these clauses stand up in court under a contest of their validity;
if the restraint is overly broad, will a court pare the covenant down
to a reasonable scope and enforce it in that modified form; or will
the covenant be declared completely unenforceable?
Many employees of American businesses are subject to cove-
nants of non-competition with former employers following termina-
tion of their employment. The employees required to become parties
to these restrictions are commonly managerial, technical, and sales
personnel having access to an employer's confidential information. 0
A covenant of this type will generally provide that the employee will
not accept employment from a competitor or set up his own compet-
ing business for a specified period of time within a certain geogra-
phical area."' Covenants of this type have been traditionally con-
sidered at common law to be in restraint of trade and have been the
subject of repeated litigation.62 Their treatment by the courts has
reflected the developing industrial, technological, and business meth-
ods, as well as the prevalent social values, including freedom of con-
tract, personal economic freedom, and business ethics; however, the
basic interests which enter into the controversy have not changed.63
From the standpoint of the employer these postemployment re-
strictions are probably the only really effective way in which he can
prevent employees from misappropriating valuable trade secrets.
60 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAgv. L. R-v. 625, 626 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Blake].
61 Id. at 626.
62 Smith v. Scott, 4 Paton 17 (H.L. 1798) (Scot.).
63 Blake at 626-27.
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Without the protection given by these covenants, the businessman
could not afford to foster research programs or to seek substantial
improvement of his business methods. In addition, refusal to enforce
these covenants would impair the freedom of communication neces-
sary for efficient operation of businesses0 4
From the employee's point of view these restrictive covenants
impair both his economic mobility and his personal freedom to fol-
low his own interests. These covenants also detrimentally affect
competition by deterring potential competitors and by slowing the
dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods. They weaken the
employee's bargaining power with the employer and prevent the
employee's movement to the job in which he may most effectively
utilize his skills.65
No commitment not to compete can be implied from an ordin-
ary employment contract.06 Courts tend to look critically upon this
type of restraint, and often discover that the parties to the restrictions
were in unequal bargaining positions so that the restraints were
most likely imposed upon the employee rather than bargained for.67
They may find that the employee has improvidently given
up his only valuable economic asset, specialized proficiency aris-
ing from experience or training. [Because of this] ... courts are
more likely to declare an employee covenant invalid as unreason-
able, or, in giving injunctive relief, they are more likely to re-
quire that an employer settle for less thorough going protection
than that accorded a transferee of a property interest.68
This inequity in bargaining power may be at least partially neg-
atived by the fact that the employment market has become highly
competitive, especially with respect to the more highly qualified per-
sonnel that would have access to an employer's secret information.
Many of these personnel are refusing to agree to the restrictions on
their economic freedom and mobility. 9
64 Id. at 627.
65 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 137
(9th Cir. 1965).
66 Inboden v. Hawker, 41 N.E2d 271, 276 (Ohio App. 1941); Curry v. Marquart, 133
Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
67 Blake, supra note 60, at 648.
68 Id. See, e.g., Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 45-46, 105 NE.2d 685, 704 (C.P.
1952).
09 Note, Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16
W. REs. L. Rnv. 161, 162 (1964).
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Even though covenants not to compete for a time subsequent
to employment may be found invalid, they are necessary in the cases
where a need for protection does exist. This is so because
An injunction not to disclose can seldom undo or effectively
prevent the doing of the real damage. Even in the best of good
faith, a former technical or "creative" employee working for a
competitor, or in business for himself in the same or a related
field, can hardly prevent his knowledge of his former employer's
confidential methods or data from showing up in his work.7 0
In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering
Corp.,71 it was held that a simple injunction against the use and
disclosure by a former employee of the plaintiff who had been hired
by one of plaintiff's competitors would be inadequate in view of
the virtual impossibility of the employee's performing all his pro-
spective duties for the competitor without giving the competitor
the benefit of the former employer's confidential information. The
court enjoined the employee from working for the competitor in the
capacity in which he had been employed while with the plaintiff.
The traditional dimensions of these restraints have been those
of time and space. However, with the growing complexity of em-
ployment duties, it has been necessary to develop a new dimension
in regard to the restraints. "The 'activity' dimension was not an
issue in the earliest cases .... [D]ivision of labor and specialization
now make it of the utmost importance that a restraint define care-
fully the activities in which the employee is not to engage" 72 in
order that the covenant not be held unreasonable. A provision in an
employment contract which prohibits disclosure of particular trade
secrets will usually not impair an employee's opportunities for re-
lated employment and for this reason will have few problems in the
courts as to invalidity based on any unreasonableness of the restraint.
However, if the covenant not to disclose contains a general prohibi-
tion against the disclosure of all trade secrets, the restraint would
naturally be far more restrictive on any future employment oppor-
tunities of this employee. 3 This is especially so in Ohio due to the
very broad definition of trade secret recently adopted in the Cord
case.74 These broad restraints not to disclose may therefore have re-
70 Blake, supra note 60, at 669-70.
71 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
72 Blake, supra note 60, at 675.
73 16 W. Rts. L. REv., supra note 69, at 173.
74 Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Services, Inc., 194 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio
C.P. 1963) rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 148, 207 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
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strictive effects as potent as any non-competition restraint. This pre-
sents a strong argument for the proposition that the same standards
should be applied to these broad non-disclosure covenants.7 5
In all but the smallest businesses it is administratively impos-
sible to tailor each covenant to the particular requirements of the
individual employee. Relatively few forms must be used for large
numbers of employees in divergent circumstances. Even when the
employer acts in absolute good faith in creating restrictions, a par-
ticular restraint as applied to a particular employee may be more
burdensome than would have been necessary if the restraint had
been drawn up with this specific employee in mind. Still, the facts
before the court may indicate that injunctive relief is both appro-
priate and necessary.76
The alternative argument is that if judicial modification is
freely applied, employers could fashion overly restrictive covenants
knowing that, if the facts of the particular case call for it, the court
will modify the restraints and enforce them as modified. The clauses
will then exercise an in terrorem effect on the employees subject
to them and restrict their mobility.77
The general approach to the resolution of this dilemma of con-
flicting interests should be apparent. Where it is evident that an
employer's policy with respect to the imposition of these restraints
on his employees is generally fair and designed to afford protection
only to that empolyer's legitimate interests, a court should modify
the covenant involved if such modification is necessary to provide
reasonable protection for the employer with as little burden as pos-
sible on the employee. Conversely, when it is evident that an em-
ployer's fundamental policy in requiring these clauses is to gain an
advantage in bargaining position over the employee, to tie the em-
ployee to his job, or to achieve some illegitimate purpose, severance
or modification of the terms of the restrictions should be denied
by the courts.7 8
When considering the validity of post-employment covenants
not to compete, the Ohio courts have ruled that the restraint is valid
if reasonable in view of all the facts of the particular case, with re-
spect to the employer, the employee, and the public.79 These cove-
75 Blake, supra note 60, at 678.
76 Id. at 683.
77 Id. at 682-83.
78 Id. at 683-84.
79 Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 686 (Ohio C.P.
1952).
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nants are reasonable only if the restraints are no greater than neces-
sary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest, are not
unduly oppressive on the employee, and are not injurious to the
public8 0
In addition to the absence or presence of limitations as to
time and space, when attempting to decide the reasonableness of
the restraint, the courts have considered the following fac-
tors: ... ; whether the employee is possessed with confidential
information or trade secrets; whether the covenant seeks to elimi-
nate competition which would be unfair to the employer or
merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition; whether the
covenant seeks to stifle the inherent skill and experience of the
employee; whether the benefit to the employer is dispropor-
tionate to the detriment to the employee; whether the covenant
operates as a bar to the employee's sole means of support; ...
and whether the forbidden employment is merely incidental to
the main employment. 8 '
This is by no means an exhaustive listing of the factors considered
by the courts in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive cov-
enant; however, these are some of the more important factors to be
considered.
The restraint must be limited as to time and space, and must
not restrain the employee more than is reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the employer's business.8 2 The determination of reasonable
necessity is dependent upon the nature and extent of the employer's
business and the nature and extent of the services rendered by the
employee.8 3
If a court decides after considering all the above-mentioned
factors that a particular restrictive covenant is reasonable as to time,
space, employer, employee, public, and any other factors the indi-
vidual court might happen to include in its analysis, then it will find
the restraint to be valid. A court, however, might easily find a re-
straint invalid and unreasonable. In 1964, in the case of Extine v.
Williamson Midwest, Inc.,"" Ohio acknowledged its adherence to
the "blue pencil" rule as to unreasonable restraints. Essentially, the
"blue pencil" doctrine holds that, if a court can render an unreason-
able covenant reasonable by deleting the offensive or unreasonable
80 Id.
81 Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 406, 200 N.E.2d 297,
299 (1964).
82 Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757, 758 (1942).
88 Id.
84 176 Ohio St. 403, 405, 200 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1964).
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parts, it should so delete and enforce the restraint as to the remain-
der. 85 The simplest example of the rule as applied is a clause
restraining the employee from competing with his former employer
in Youngstown, in Ohio, and in the United States. If a court should
find that the employer does business only in Youngstown, the re-
straint as worded would be considered unreasonable; and, apply-
ing the "blue pencil" or partial validity rule, the court would de-
lete the area restrictions as to Ohio and the United States, enforc-
ing the restriction only as to Youngstown.
The Extine case did acknowledge the existence of a growing
minority position that does not require divisibility of terms in or-
der to modify the restraint and enforce it in that modified form;86
however, that court did, for the time being at least, reject this posi-
tion in favor of the traditional "blue pencil" test of validity.87 The
"blue pencil" rule in its traditional form was reaffirmed recently in
two late 1967 courts of appeal cases, 88 so it appears that for the
present the Ohio courts will continue either to require the terms of
the restrictive covenant to be divisible or to reject them altogether
if they find them to be unreasonable. The degree to which the
courts ultimately adhere to the "blue pencil" test will eventually be
ascertained when the Ohio Supreme Court is confronted with a
time restriction that is clearly unreasonable and indivisible, but the
situation before the Court does call for some restraint to protect a
legitimate interest of the employer.89
Following are examples of two restrictive covenants which
might be acceptable to the courts of Ohio and, if so, would assure
the employer the maximum possible protection of his trade secrets
from misappropriation in any unlawful form. It must be emphasized
that these covenants are generalizations and that each should be
adapted as much as possible to the peculiar needs of the employer.
Covenant of Non-disclosure
All information of a business or technical nature imparted
to or learned by the employee in the course of his employment
85 E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler, 12 Ohio App. 2d 16, 22, 230 N.E.2d 552, 556
(1967).
88 Extine v. Williamson Midwest Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 405, 200 NXE.2d 297, 299
(1964).
87 Id.
88 Gobel v. Laing, 12 Ohio App. 2d 93, 231 N.E.2d 341 (1967); E.P.I. of Cleveland,
Inc. v. Basler, 12 Ohio App. 2d 16, 230 N.E.2d 552 (1967).
8 Krieder, Trends In the Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35
U. CINN. L. Rrv. 16, 29 (1966).
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with respect to the business of the Company, or its affiliates, in-
cluding the improvements, inventions and discoveries... (which
employee developed or shared in the development of as a func-
tion of his employment with the company), shall be deemed to
be confidential and shall not be disclosed by the employee to
anyone outside the employ of the Company or its affiliates with-
out the Company's express authorization, unless such informa-
tion has been made generally available to the trade. If the em-
ployee leaves the employ of the Company, such authorization to
disclose information must be obtained in writing, and he shall
not take with him any originals or copies of any drawings, other
documents, or development or pre-production models containing
or disclosing information. The business and technical informa-
tion developed and acquired by the Company is among the em-
ployer's most valuable assets, and its value may be unwittingly
destroyed by casual dissemination. All employees are therefore
expected to safeguard this information as carefully as other
property of the employer.90
Covenant Not to Compete
Employee agrees that following termination of his employ-
ment with Employer he will not engage in competition with
Employer in any form, whether as an employee of a competitor
or otherwise, in an identical or similar capacity as that in which
he engaged while with Employer. The parties acknowledge that
these restraints are necessary to protect legitimate interests of
Employer, including but not limited to trade secrets and other
confidential information learned by Employee in the course of
his employment.
These restrictions on competitive employment are to have
effect for a period of X years, Y months, following the termina-
tion of employment, or if the court should find this period to be
longer than necessary in this case, for that period of time
which it finds necessary to afford the Employer's interest reason-
able protection. The Employee agrees not to compete with Em-
ployer in an area of X miles in any direction around the city of
A, in the county(ies) of B, C, and D, and the state(s) of E, F,
and G.
The starting area unit will depend on the nature and size of the
business involved. The areas to be prohibited should be separately
specified. This is to make it possible for an Ohio court to apply the
"blue pencil" test of validity to those severable parts of the restraints,
throwing out those it finds unreasonable and giving effect to those
it finds reasonable.
90 See Harding, Trade Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAwYER 895,
app. B at 411 (1967).
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An employer may also desire to formulate provisions to the gen-
eral effect that:
1. Employer agrees to pay Employee a certain sum or percentage
of Employee's former salary for the period during which Em-
ployee refrains from competing with Employer.
2. Employee agrees that he will pay Employer X sum as liquida-
ted damages in event of breach of this restrictive covenant
by Employee.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ohio has adopted an extremely broad definition of trade secret,
indicating a determination that the term in any general sense is in-
definable. The courts have been willing on a case by case basis to
find that a trade secret exists in a particular case. The basis of most
trade secret cases is a confidential relationship existing between the
employer and employee, and an implied duty rests on an employee
not to disclose the employer's trade secrets to outsiders. There are
a variety of remedies available against misappropriators of an em-
ployer's trade secrets, the most common being a temporary injunc-
tion restraining use and disclosure. If enacted, section 43(a)(4) of
S.1154 will provide a basis for a much needed uniform system of
trade secrets law enabling employees and employers to avoid the
confusion that accompanies the present system. The way for em-
ployers to obtain adequate protection of their trade secrets is to re-
quire their employees to enter restrictive covenants with the employer
to the effect that the employee will not compete with the employer
for a specified period of time and in a certain area following termi-
nation of employment. These restrictive covenants are valid if rea-
sonable as to the employer, the employee, and the public. Ohio
continues to apply the "blue pencil" test as to modification of these
restrictive covenants if the terms are considered unreasonable and
require that the terms be divisible to be so modified. Thus Ohio
attorneys should structure such restrictive covenants carefully so
that in the event of a court challenge all that is reasonable will
continue to be enforceable.
David R. Barnhizer
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